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Abstract
Many new models for measuring financial contagion have been
presented recently. While these models have not been specified for
investment funds directly, there are many similarities that could be
explored to extend the models. In this work we explore ideas devel-
oped about financial contagion to create a network of investment funds
using both cross-holding of quotas and a bipartite network of funds
and assets. Using data from the Brazilian asset management market
we analyze not only the contagion pattern but also the structure of this
network and how this model can be used to assess the stability of the
market.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the use of network representations for the study of economic
systems has become ubiquitous, with many applications in the study of
labor markets, micro-finance and production chains Allen and Babus (2008).
A special subject in these topics is the study of financial systems. Since
the global financial crisis that hit the world in 2007-08 the interest in the
intricate ways in which financial institutions are intertwined has soared,
with studies showing the several facets of the interconnections of financial
systems, specially in the way these connections affect global stability.
The 2007-08 crisis, which started in the US sub-prime mortgage mar-
ket, rapidly spilled over to debt markets in a process of financial contagion
that ultimately led to the demise of major American and European banks
and triggered a world recession that spanned years. Interconnection is also
a cause of major concern in the ongoing European debt crisis, with worries
that the interconnection in the European bank system may cause a serious
crisis if one nation defaults on its sovereign debt or enters into recession
putting some of the external private debt at risk.
Due to the aforementioned events, much of the studies on the con-
nectedness of financial institutions is focused on the mutual exposures
between banks, specially the ones acquired on the interbank market (see
Cocco et al. (2009), Mistrulli (2011) and Iori et al. (2006)). But more recently
some attention has been devoted to non-bank financial intermediaries, such
as the studies being conducted by the Financial Stability Board to address
what in being called the ”Shadow Banking System” (Board (2011a) and
Board (2011b)). In this work, we aim to explore one of these elements of
financial systems, the asset management industry.
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In the Brazilian market, in 2014, asset management firms oversaw
the allocation of approximately U$ 1T in financial assets, consisting of a
substantial part of the Brazilian financial system. Not only is the industry
significant in size, but these firms and the funds they manage transact with
other institutions in the financial system, and within themselves, in a variety
of ways. As a consequence, this industry is heavily interconnected with
the bank and insurance markets, augmenting greatly the effects it could
potentially have if the industry were hit by a major financial shock.
While it is still highly debatable whether asset management in fact
poses systemic risk, the industry has a number of factors that make it suscep-
tible to financial shocks. Behaviors such as reaching for yield and herding,
redemption risks associated to liquidity mismatch, high leverage and even
behaviors of the asset managers can represent sources of risk (for a deeper
discussion of the risks of asset management see the recent report of the
Office of Financial Research, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2013)). These
are factors that have the potential to amplify financial shocks over the funds
and, if the system is heavily interconnected, cause cascading failures and
heavy losses to the entire financial system.
In this paper we develop a network model to assess the inter-connectivity
and how cascading failures can occur among investment funds. We also
take a empirical approach to study the asset management market through
simulations with data from the Brazilian Market.
In a simple definition, networks can be described as collections of
objects in which some objects can be connected forming a set of links. By
this generic definition, many types of connections can be used to compose
the edge’s set (Easley and Kleinberg (2010)).
The literature on financial networks contains many proposed metrics
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which can be used to define the connections between firms. For instance,
Huang et al. (2013) propose the use of a bipartite network between firms
and assets where a link represents a ownership relation between firm and
asset, Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) propose connectedness measures built
from pieces of variance decompositions and Billio et al. (2012) proposes a
set of econometric measures based on principal-components analysis and
Granger-causality networks. In this regards we follow closely the approach
adopted by Elliott et al. (2014), in which cross-holdings of organizations
shares form the edges, taken together with the approach from Huang et al.
(2013), to better explain the effects of the contagion over common asset
holdings as well.
By forming networks considering cross-holdings and common asset
holdings we can analyze the structure of an investment fund network and
look for potential impacts of financial shocks using contagion and diffusion
models. While our model uses the ideas from the aforementioned works, this
approach is not exhaustive, there are many other contagion and diffusion
models in the finance literature which could have been explored (see Gai
and Kapadia (2010) and Allen and Gale (2000)).
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
provide a background and basic terminology on graphs and networks that
will be used throughout the analysis. In Section 3 we present the contagion
model using the frameworks developed by Elliott et al. (2014) and Huang
et al. (2013). Section 4 describes the data used and give a brief overview
of asset management in Brazil. Section 5 presents the findings about the
network structure and the results of simulations over the data. Finally, in
Section 6 we discuss future research directions and present a summary and
final remarks on the work.
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2 Graph Theory and Network Science
In this section we provide some basic terminology about the concepts used
along this paper. Its comprises concepts from graph theory for the repre-
sentation of networks and from Social / Economic Network Analysis for
understanding network structure and stability.
2.1 Graph Theory
A graph is a mathematical construct of a set of objects, called nodes or
vertices, connected by a set of links, called edges. More formally a graph
G = (V, E) is an ordered pair consisting of a set of nodes V and a set of
edges E where E ⊆ V ×V. The order of the graph is the number of nodes
n = |V| and its size is the number of vertices m = |E|.
A graph may be directed or undirected. A directed graph (or digraph)
is a ordered pair D = (V, E) consisting of a set of nodes V and a set of edges
E where E ⊆ V ×V and where, for every edge (u, v) ∈ E, there is a link that
leaves u and enters v. We say that u is the tail and v is the head.
An import metric of networks is their degree distribution. The degree
of a node di is the number of connections it has. For a digraph we define in-
degree as the number of connections incoming to a node and the out-degree
as the number of connections leaving the node.
Graph labeling is the assignment of labels to edges and/or nodes of
a graph. These labels often represent attributes of the graph. In a labeled
graph we define the set of edges E ⊆ V × L × V where L is the set of
labels. A weighted graph is a labeled graph where edge labels are members
of an ordered set, usually of integers or real numbers, which represent the
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Figure 1: A weighted directed graph
”strength” of the connections. We define wij as the weigh between nodes i
and j.
There are many ways to represent graphs. In this work, they are
usually represented by their adjacency matrix. An adjacency matrix M, is a
matrix whose entry Mij = wij. In an unweighed graph we use wij = 1 by
definition.
2.2 Centrality Measures
Graphs are a natural way to represent networks, but social economic net-
works usually exhibit some properties better analyzed through specific
metrics. As was found by Albert and Baraba´si (2002), many real networks
exhibit a property that their degree distributions are scale-free. In social and
economic networks, this property can create a structure where a few mem-
bers of the network can gather most of the connections, thus, controlling
the flow of information in the network. This brings up the importance of
analyzing the influence of members in a network. One way to analyze this
importance is through centrality measures.
Centrality measures aim to describe how a given node relate to the
network in some aspect of its structure, such as node position in the network.
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Four types of centrality measures are usually described in the network
literature (Jackson et al. (2008)), each one aiming to describe an different
aspect of node importance in the network. These are:
1. Degree Centrality: How many connections a node has;
2. Closeness Centrality: How easily a node can reach other nodes;
3. Betweenness Centrality: How central the node is in creating paths
between other nodes;
4. Eigenvector Centrality: How important (well connected) the node’s
neighbors are.
Degree Centrality is considered the most classical measure of cen-
trality and it measures how import a node is by the number of connections
it has (Freeman et al. (1980)). The degree centrality is simply measured by
Cd(u) = di(u). While it is a relevant measure, it is considered limited for
analyzing node influence. It’s main flaw is that it misses the location of the
node in the network while for some applications, like spread of processes,
the position of the node in the network is a fundamental aspect.
Closeness Centrality measures a node importance by how close it
is to any other node in the network (Freeman et al. (1980)) . One way to
measure closeness is:
Cc(u) =
n− 1
∑n−1v=1 d(v, u)
, (1)
where d(v, u) is is the shortest-path distance between v and u, and
n is the number of nodes in the graph. In a diffusion process, the nodes
with highest closeness centrality are likely to be affect by the process more
rapidly than others.
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Betweenness Centrality captures how well situated a node is in
terms of the paths (Freeman et al. (1980)) in the network. The betweenness
centrality of a node u is the sum of the fraction of all-pairs shortest paths
that pass through it. Mathematically we measure betweenness as::
Cb(u) = ∑
s,t∈V
σ(s, t|u)
σ(s, t)
, (2)
where σ(s, t|u) is the number of shortest (s, t)-paths and σ(s, t) is the
number of those paths passing through u. In a diffusion process, a node that
has high betweenness can control the flow of information in the network.
Eigenvector Centrality is based on the premise that a node’s impor-
tance is measured by how important it’s connections are (Bonacich (1972)).
The eigenvector centrality for node u is xi where i is the index of node u and
xi is the principal eigenvector in:
Ax = λx (3)
where A is the adjacency matrix of the network. In diffusion process,
an node who is high on eigenvector centrality is connected to many nodes
which themselves are connected to many nodes, thus multiplying their
probability of contagion.
2.3 Homophily and Assortativity
Social and Economic networks sometimes exhibit a property that entities are
more prone to establish connections with similar entities. This property was
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named homophily by Kandel (1978). Homophily may play an important role
in economic networks, since it can mean a network can be largely segregated
(Jackson et al. (2008)).
One way to measure homophily among labeled nodes is by assorta-
tivity. Assortativity measures the similarity of connections in a network with
relation to some attribute or label. We define the assortativity coefficient as:
r = ∑i
mii −∑i aibi
1−∑i aibi
, (4)
where mij is the fraction of edges in the network that connect a type i
node to a type j and mij = aibj. The matrix M is the joint probability distribu-
tion (mixing matrix) of the specified attribute Newman (2003). Assortativity
may play an important whole in financial networks as segregated financial
firms may form regions of closure for the spreading of losses.
2.4 Dynamic Networks
Some networks vary over time. The field that studies how networks change
over time is known as network dynamics or dynamic network analysis
(DNA). The main aspects of DNA is the analysis of the statistical properties
of time varying networks and the simulation of network changes over time.
DNA is a broad field and we refer to the work of Carley (2003) for those
interested in it. For the purpose of financial networks and contagion we
focus on the stability of financial networks over time.
One way to measure network stability over time is to check the
Jaccard similarity of nodes and/or edges between pairs of successive time
spans (Masys (2014)). This is a indication of how much nodes and/or edges
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are formed or removed from the network between small time steps. The
Jaccard similarity coefficient is a measure of similarity between sets. The
coefficient of a set S and a set T is |S ∩ T|/|S ∪ T|, that is, the ratio of the
size of the intersection of S and T to the size of their union (Rajaraman et al.
(2012)).
3 The Cross-Holdings Contagion Model
In determining interconnectivity between investment funds we follow closely
the model developed by Elliott et al. (2014) for financial firms in which cross-
holdings of shares among organizations may lead to cascading failures. In
the context of investment funds, we measure cross-holdings of fund’s quotas.
We differ from the model when common assets holdings are considered in
the process and in this regard we use the framework developed by Huang
et al. (2013).
3.1 Primitive Assets and Cross-Holdings
In the original model developed by Elliott et al. (2014) the value of organi-
zations are determined by factors of production ( represented by the assets
the organizations own)and the shares of the other organizations which they
hold. There are n organizations making up a set N = 1, 2, ..., n. There is
also a group of assets in the economy that may be owned by firms and
these assets compose another set M = 1, 2, ..., m. For investment funds as
organizations, the primitive assets are formed by assets not issued by other
investment funds and legally permitted to be bought by funds, these may
be shares of companies, corporate bonds, government bonds, derivatives,
among others. Funds can also hold shares of other funds, which creates
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the cross-holdings among organizations. As the funds are the only orga-
nizations in our system we shall use the terms interchangeably from this
point.
The base value of a fund is determined by the value of it’s assets.
The value of an asset k is denoted by pk and we call p the vector containing
the values of the assets in M. We also call D the matrix which entry Dik
is the share of the value of asset k held by organization i. Complementary
to D we have the matrix C in which, for each, i, j ∈ N, Cij ≥ 0 is the
fraction of organization i owned by organization j. The matrix C can be
seen as a network of direct links between the organizations. There is also
the share Cˆii := 1−∑i∈N Cij of organization i which is not owned by other
organizations in the system. This forms the matrix Cˆ.
To determine the fair value of organizations, Elliott et al. (2014) used
a framework developed by Fedenia et al. (1994) and Brioschi et al. (1989).
The value vi of organization i is determined by the value of it’s assets plus
the value of it’s applications on other organizations:
vi =∑
k
Dik pk +∑
j
Cijvj (5)
This equation can be expressed in matrix form by V = Dp+CV and
is solved to yield:
V = (I− C)−1Dp (6)
Brioschi et al. (1989) and Fedenia et al. (1994) argue that the true value
of an organization is better captured by what is held by outside investors.
This value is equal to v˙i = Cˆiivi, leading to:
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V˙ = Cˆ(I− C)−1Dp = ADp (7)
We also call A = Cˆ(I− C)−1 the dependency matrix. It captures the
true value of the cross-holdings of quotas in the market and allow us to
measure the true value of the funds and how changes in one organization’s
value shall affect any other.
3.2 Firm Susceptibility to Financial Shocks
Organizations can lose value in discontinuous ways under certain situations.
We call these losses failure costs. Failure costs are assumed if an organization
falls bellow some value threshold, in which case we can interpret that it has
transitioned from a financially stable situation to an unstable one (Elliott
et al. (2014)). So, if organization i value’s fall below some threshold v¯i, it
incurs in failure costs βi(p).
In a more general setting there are many possible explanations for
failure costs. The main assumption in investment funds is that under certain
situations there main occur a run on the fund, forcing it to sell assets at inop-
portune times at a discount rate, leading to the discontinuous losses. There
may be many situations causing this run on the fund, such as reputation risk
generated by the asset manager, performance risk caused by risky strategies
and leverage, or economic risks such as financial bubbles and idiosyncratic
shocks.
When funds are directly connected by cross holdings the spread of a
discontinuous loss is straightforward. Nevertheless, failure costs incurred
by one organization may ”affect” other organizations even if they are not
directly connected in the network. The main way in which it can happen is
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common asset holdings. Since many assets are held simultaneously by many
firms, the way one firm incurs in failure costs can force it to fire sale it’s
assets and force the price of the asset down in a way that other organizations
holding the same assets may also face difficulties.
To correctly address the effect of common asset holdings we use the
framework developed by Huang et al. (2013). In addition to the network of
cross-holdings described in Equation 6 we use a ancillary network formed
by organizations as one type of node and assets as the other.
In this network a link between a fund and an asset exists if the fund
has the asset on its portfolio. It is a bipartite weighted graph where the
weights on the links represent the gross value of the portfolio position in
the asset.
Let B be the bipartite network between the organizations in N and
the assets in M. We have that
B =
0n,n W
WT 0m,m
 ,
where W is a n × m sub-matrix where wij is the value of the position of
fund i in asset j. We can rewrite the term Dp in 7 in terms of W. Let
~1 = [1, 1, 1, ..., 1]Tn . We write:
Dp = W~1.
And Eq. 6 leading to:
V = AW~1 (8)
In the presence of financial instability for an organization i, not only
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failure costs βi are incurred but also every asset j owned by i suffer a pressure
to go down, becoming: pj =
∑i wij −ωwik
∑i wij
.
3.3 The Contagion Model
Financial contagion can occur when one organization fails and it’s losses
spread to other organizations causing them to fail as well. This can have the
potential to generate a cascade of failures, potentially breaking the financial
system as a whole.
The financial contagion process can be described as a diffusion pro-
cess where losses spread in the network of interconnections. Through both
the cross-holdings connections and common asset holdings funds can be
affected by this diffusion process.
If funds are directly connected, discontinuities will propagate in the
cross-holdings network, affecting the final value of other funds invested in
the broken firms in the path of connections. These affected funds, in turn,
may start to face difficulties and cause new failures and discontinuous losses.
At the same time, these funds may be forced to sell their assets, causing
drops in asset prices which may also cause new failures and discontinuous
losses. These losses shall propagate until a new equilibrium is reached.
But prior to contagion we must have a shock over the system. This
shock can be of any kind, but for the contagion to be triggered at least one
fund must lose value until it fall bellow the critical value to move the system
from equilibrium.
Bellow we describe an algorithm containing the step-by-step process
to simulate the cascading failure process.
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1. Let Zt be the set of failed organizations at step t. We initialize Z0 = ∅,
indicating a starting state of equilibrium.
2. At the initial moment we shock a market asset mi or a set of assets
M = {m1, m2, ..., mk} to be affected by the first shock (Affected assets
depend on the nature of the shock). Each asset is reduced to a fraction
of its original value ηpi, where η < 1 is determined by the strength of
the shock.
3. After the initial shock, the loss spreads in the network of cross-holdings
and we recalculate the value of each fund in the system using Equa-
tion8, checking which of them have fallen bellow a critical value vcrit.
Each fund i in which vi < vcrit(i) is added to Z.
4. We start the iterative process. At step t, Let b˜t−1 be a vector with
element b˜i = βi if i ∈ Zt−1 and 0 otherwise, where βi is the loss
in value due to failure. Also, for each asset mj connected with each
fund i in Zt−1, its overall market value is reduced as the market’s
reaction to the fund failure. The price of asset mj owned by i becomes
pi =
∑i wij −ωwij
∑i wij
, where ω is a parameter that measures the strength
of the fire sales over the market price of the asset .
5. The new set Zt is formed by the funds which have negative values in:
A
[
W~1− b˜t−1
]
− vcrit.
6. We terminate if Zt = Zt−1. Otherwise, we go back to step 4.
This algorithm provides a framework to understand how damages
spread to both other funds and to assets until the cascading failure stops. It
also describes a hierarchy of vulnerability under a specific crisis which is
determined by the initial shock.
Many parameters can affect the results of the algorithm. The strength
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of the initial shock, the assets affected by the shock, the critical value of the
funds, the strength of the discontinuous losses and of the fire sales are all
inputs of the algorithm and must be determined ex-ante.
Next we will present data taken from the Brazilian asset management
industry and exemplify the results of the algorithm with simulations.
4 The Data
Investment funds , sometimes referred to as collective investment vehicles,
are financial intermediaries that collect financial resources from a pool of
investors, both individuals and companies, and apply these resources into a
pool of assets (Bodie et al. (2009)).
In Brazil, investment funds are regulated by the Securities and Ex-
change Comission of Brazil (CVM) through CVM Instruction 555 (ICVM
555) 1 2. Investment funds are devoid from legal personality, despite that,
they are capable of acquiring and transferring assets and rights, always
represented by their administrators and managers (Fortuna (2008)).
Traditionally, funds are classified as fixed income and variable income
to discriminate the level of risk of their strategies. Fixed income funds invest
in assets with a fixed return rate, such as government bonds and private
credit, and variable income funds investing in assets with returns that vary
with the market, such as shares of companies. This classification can be
1ICVM 555 is the current legal diploma for the regulation of investment funds, but many
of the classifications used in this paper are based on the definitions of CVM Instruction 409,
which was the legal diploma in the period of the analysis.
2ICVM 555 regulate both mutual funds and hedge funds, but not Brazilian structured
funds (REITs and Receivable funds). Brazilian structured funds are not included in our
simulations.
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refined to better represent investment strategies, two common classifications
are provided by the Brazilian Financial and Capital Markets Association
(Anbima) and by CVM. In this work we will adopt the classification used by
CVM.
According to CVM’s classification, funds are organized in 7 classes
which reflect their investment strategies and profile of risk according to
the assets they can buy. Fixed-income funds are the most representative
class in terms of total assets and Multimarket funds comprise the class with
biggest number of funds. Multimarket funds are the class with most diverse
strategies and portfolios, as can be seen in figure 2.
Another broadly used classification is for open-ended, which are
funds open to redemption at any time after a determined grace period, and
closed-ended funds, for funds with strict restrictions or even completely
unavailable for redemption. 3. Open-ended funds are the majority both in
number of funds and in number of assets under management. Close-ended
funds are excluded in simulations, since they are much less susceptible to
events that could trigger failure costs, as modeled in this work, such as a
run on the fund.
For this study we used data of investment funds from the CVM
database. To analyze the network structure we used data from January 2012
up to December 2014 and for the simulations we used data from December
2014.
3For a full description of classifications of investment funds in Brazil see CVM Instruction
555 and for a broader description of the Brazilian Capital Market see Fortuna (2008) and
Assaf Neto (2001)
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Figure 2: Portfolio composition by fund class. Fixed income funds represent most of the total
asset in the industry. Fund quotas is by far the most owned asset, representing a potential
source of contagion. Brazilian government bonds follow as second most owned asset.
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Figure 3: Number of funds by fund class. Multimarket funds represent the largest class in
number of funds, followed by fixed-income and equity funds. Funds with more risk appetite
are more numerous but smaller in total assets.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Network Topology
To better understand how the market is organized we take a brief look at
some key features of the network topology. We then proceed to present the
results of the simulation experiments and discuss the role of the topology in
the system’s dynamics.
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Figure 4: Stability of the Investment Fund network. The table shows Jaccard coeffients
of edges and nodes for the network in pairs of months over the period from Jan/2012 to
Dec/2014.
5.1.1 Stability
The structure of the network and it’s stability over time reflect investment
decisions from asset managers. As in Masys (2014) Jaccard similarity co-
efficients are used to measure the structural stability of the network over
pairs of successive periods. Figure 5 shows the network growth over time
and Figure 4 reports a summary of the Jaccard coefficients. The network
exhibit considerable stability between successive months, the number of
nodes exhibit growth at a steady rate while the number of connections seems
to fluctuate more, exhibiting a hump. This fluctuation may indicate some
relationship between the edge count and economic variables which could be
further investigated. On average, more then 90% of connections are stable
between periods, which support running dynamic models (Snijders et al.
(2010)) such as the cascading failures model.
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Figure 5: Number of nodes and connections on the network over time. The number over
funds grows slowly but steadily over time. The number of edges fluctuates.
5.1.2 Network Metrics
The cross-holdings network has very low connectivity with an average
degree of davg = 4.34. The degree histogram shows a typical scale free
distribution but in-degree and out-degree curves have very different shapes
as can be seen in Figure 6. The highest in-degree is 889 and highest out-
degree is 70. The in-degree is the most interesting metric since it is the one
that shows how many other funds are directly affected by the spreading of
losses in the cross-holdings network.
The fund-asset network, on the order hand, has an average degree of
davg = 20.23. If we disregard cash, which is connected to almost all funds,
the highest asset in-degree of 4838. The degree distribution in Figure 7
shows that a few assets are present in many portfolios displaying a high
level of concentration.
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(a) In degree histogram (b) Out degree histogram
Figure 6: The directionality of the edges indicates the investor fund as the tail and the
invested fund as the head. (a) In degree histogram for the cross-holdings network. The
histogram exhibit typical power law (b) Out degree histogram for the cross-holdings network.
The steepness of the curve is much lower in the out-degree distribution.
Comparing the two networks we can observe that the fund-asset
network is much more dense, with values of 0.001070 for the fund-asset
network and 0.00034 for the cross-holdings network. In Table 1 we can see
that in the fund-asset network there are some very central nodes while in the
cross-holding network this metric is much weaker. While assortativity is not
a relevant metric in the fund-asset network, in the cross-holding network
we can observe some level of segregation. Most notably, funds from same
Administrators show assortativity of 0.502 and funds from the same class
exhibit assortativity of 0.217. While the segregation of funds of the same
class is not high enough to indicate regions of confinement for the spread of
risk, the segregation among administrators may be an issue of attention.
The nature of the spreading process in this model is very different
in the cross-holding network and in the bipartite network of funds and
assets. The results above indicate that we could observe a faster spreading
of contagion caused by asset connections than by cross-holding connections,
this is due to the fact that the network is more dense and central assets play
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Table 1: Maximum centrality observed in both networks. The Fund-Asset network has nodes
with much stronger presence as hubs.
Cross-Holdings Network Fund-Asset Network
Max. Degree Centrality 0.069 0.256
Max. Closeness Centrality 0.006 0.437
Max. Betweenness Centrality 5.98e-05 0.035
Max. Eigenvector Centrality 0.788 0.670
a stronger whole as hubs.
(a) Degree histogram for fund nodes. (b) Degree histogram for asset nodes.
Figure 7: Degree histograms for both types of nodes in the bipartite fund-asset network.
While both distributions exhibit characteristic power law shapes, the hubs are much more
prominent among assets than funds.
5.2 Simulations
In this section we illustrate how the use of some network metrics combined
with the contagion model can be used to monitor the stability of the financial
system and to identify institutions and assets that could rapidly trigger a
contagion process. We build our illustration with a financial shock related
to the ongoing Brazilian debt crisis, stressing the system to a sovereign debt
default.
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Sovereign debt default can occur in many forms. A sovereign debt
is a contractual obligation and the most clear-cut example of default is the
failure to meet these obligations to pay interest or principal on the due
date. Another example is the failure by the government to honor debt it
has guaranteed where there are clear provisions for the guarantor to make
timely payment.
But sovereign defaults are often not so explicit. Government re-
sponses to financial distress can take many forms. In some cases, it can be
inferred that, even in the absence of an interruption of debt payments, a
default has occurred because actions by the government result in economic
losses by creditors,which can vary widely (Beers et al. (2014)).
In our network of funds and assets Federal Government Bonds oc-
cupy a very central position. It has a total market cap of 35.12% of the total
assets and it also has a degree centrality of 4838, the biggest among all assets
except for Cash. It’s average path length 2.19, showing that losses can affect
almost any other asset price in the first time step of the algorithm.
In our experimental design we vary the main inputs of the cascading
algorithm to test the susceptibility of the network in diverse settings. The
most important parameters are the rate of discontinuous loss suffered by
funds whenever they fail, the asset prices factor ω, which affects assets
of failed funds, the critical value under which the funds will fail and the
size of the initial shock.Three results are evaluated: the number of firms
failed by the financial shock, the number of total failures caused by the
cascading process and the number of iterations before the system reaches a
new equilibrium.
Figure 8a shows the number of initial failures caused by the initial
shock as we vary the size of the shock and the critical value of organizations.
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The number of failures is small when the values are close but escalates
quickly as the shock becomes much stronger than what investors would
tolerate. Figure 8b shows the number of final failures as we vary the dis-
continuous loss rate and the asset pressure rate at a fixed initial shock rate
of 30% and critical value rate of 70%. The asset pressure rate have a much
bigger effect on the number of failures , at a rate of 30% it leads to a total
meltdown of the system independently of the discontinuous loss rate. The
discontinuous loss rate does not show the potential to break the whole
system on it’s own.
These results support our initial hypothesis that the asset network
could have a much bigger influence in the final outcome of the contagion
due to the network structure and the nature of hubs. We emphasize that we
do not see these results as robust, but merely as illustrative of the dynamic
of the process.
6 Final Remarks
Financial contagion is a complex phenomena with possibly devastating
consequences to financial systems. Here, extending on previous work from
Elliott et al. (2014) and Huang et al. (2013), we have developed a model that
accounts for both cross-holdings among organizations and pressure over
asset prices using two complementary networks.
The approach we have developed can be a valuable tool for financial
supervisors and asset managers. For instance, the algorithm can be used
with scenario testing to understand the impact of possible financial crisis to
guide supervision and investment decisions. And, while we do not know
if the topological assumptions of the model hold for other financial firms,
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(a) Number of failures after the initial shock.
(b) Number of failures at new equilibrium.
Figure 8: (a) Number of failures are we vary both the critical vlaue rate and the shock rate.
(b) Number of final failures at a fixed initial shock rate of 15% and critical value rate of 85%.
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we do believe the framework is still valuable for the study of contagion
processes over other financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance
companies.
Although we believe these results are of great value for building a
theoretical understanding of financial contagion, the results obtained in
this model would hardly be reproducible in a real economy since it doesn’t
consider interaction with other financial intermediaries, existing regula-
tory measures and the direct intervention of financial regulators and/or
government bailout.
Several improvements to the modeling process are possible to make
it more realistic and closer to the observable reality. To advance this line
of research: (1) More work is required to understand critical values under
which discontinuities occur and the value of the loss caused by these dis-
continuities, (2) the effect of bankruptcy over asset prices needs to be better
determined, (3) a better model of financial shocks should be explored, (4)
the interaction with other financial intermediaries should be included and,
(5) The effects of regulation should be considered.
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